

SALTWATER FRONTIERS: Jurisdiction as a Resource for Small Islands

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*Nowhere that plough-cutworms
heal themselves in red loam;
spruces squat, skirts in sand;
or the stones of a river rattle its dark
tunnel under the elms,
is there a spot not measured by hands;
no direction I couldn't walk
to the wave-lined edge of home.
--From "The Island," by Milton Acorn*

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Small islands, sitting offshore from continental states, but still astride continental experiences, have long offered their own involvement in the various courses of our history. Often they have been asylums and havens for those seeking refuge from mainland oppression: Skye was just such a safe place for Scots looking to reclaim their birthright. Similarly, islands have been maritime frontiers for those desperate for new lives: Cape Breton and Iceland offered prospects of new beginnings for their settlers at very different stress points of European history. But islands have also been birthplaces and homes to hundreds of distinctive cultures: Tonga and Fiji, each at various times, the centres of powerful regional cultures and empires. At some points, islands have been launch pads for imperial expansion, just as they have been victims of competing empires and civilisations. Hispaniola was the base for the European reach to the Americas. Malta, on the other hand, was invaded and trespassed by every major Eurasian civilisation. More recently, for those seeking profitable ventures in offshore finance, island jurisdictions offer a panoply of inviting arrangements from the conservative well-established regimes of the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands to new regulatory systems from Vanuatu to Gibraltar, from the Caymans to Cape Verde. And, finally, for over a century, islands have presented themselves to travellers as holiday escapes from the stresses of mainland society: they are idyllic retreats to gentle and often nostalgic sensibilities of community. The Isle of Wight or Bar Harbor or Bornholm or Corfu, for example, might seem so different largely because they present the simple joys of retreat and comfort from the anxieties of life in mainland centres.

The mystique of islands, both imaginary and real, has moved generations of artists from Daniel Defoe to Robert Louis Stevenson, Paul Gauguin and Felix Mendelssohn to Jamie Wyeth and our own Milton Acorn. In short, islands have touched the human experience in rich and profound ways just as they have served a complex set of roles in their often turbulent relationships with mainland societies. In most cases, particularly in their closest relations with neighbouring mainlanders, there remains a powerful sense of maritime separateness. Even a cursory overview would support the notion that island peoples across the world have their own history and their own signature of intervention within the biographies of their continental partners.

An early and distinguished student of islands in world affairs, Stanley de Smith, noted the persistent view of island societies as insular,² a term often used in the pejorative, particularly by mainlanders.³ Indeed, insularity may itself contribute to the mystique of islands, their peoples being perceived to hold a heightened sense of their clear and unequivocal boundaries just as they are likely to be self-absorbed in their own affairs, often oblivious to or unaware of the turbulence of events beyond their shores. Of course, this is the notion of island peoples remote, detached and self-defining in the pages of Jonathan Swift or William Golding. It is reinforced in the South Pacific peregrinations of Paul Theroux,⁴ always arch in his scepticism, nonetheless understanding well the acute sensibilities of separate identity in so many of these island peoples, often particularly raw in terms of neighbouring islanders.

Notions of the inherent insularity of island peoples are, of course, resonant in some circumstances but ludicrous in others.⁵ One could hardly describe the outward-looking Icelanders as insular,⁶ though we are well aware of their fierce determination to preserve their language and culture.⁷ Conversely, insularity persists, even in highly mobile and integrated societies such as the United States and Canada: consider such powerfully self-defining local societies as the Amish or the Hutterites which continue to thrive in spite of pressures for integration. Consider, too, such independent states as Bhutan and Mongolia, or the grotesquely parochial "hermit kingdom" of North Korea, so tightly embraced as it is in the fantasies of its "Dear Leader," Kim il-Jong.⁸ And, until the recent completion of the Australian-financed Friendship Bridge, Laos was as remote and insular as any island jurisdiction in the world.

Self-defined continental communities may, of course, share islanders' determined sense of cultural survival, often against very formidable odds. The very real cultural border between Wales and England has proven remarkably distinct in spite of years of English efforts towards integration, including large-scale English settlement in the principality.⁹ It is a remarkable testament to the profound depth and resilience of Welsh culture and the Welsh resistance to assimilation, a phenomenon evident in virtually all the sub-national regions of Europe: Brittany, Catalonia, Provence and so many more.¹⁰

This is not to suggest, then, that small continental societies with a powerful sense of historical identity are any less distinct, even insular if you like. Their will to survive over long periods of time has been as resolute as that of their island counterparts. Luxembourgers have clearly thrived on a distinctive role at the very crossroads of Europe. Indeed, the survival of a healthy and powerful sense of identity in this little country is in large part due to its gestation and then nurturing as a child of the most powerful European parentage with a pedigree reaching into the history of all its neighbours.¹¹ San Marino, as a mountain redoubt claiming nearly seventeen hundred years of independent history, would demonstrate that independence defiantly in its courageous decision to welcome a hundred thousand refugees from fascist Italy which surrounded its small twenty-four square miles of territory. This dramatic assertion of separate juridical identity is all the more remarkable when one considers the appalling conditions of overcrowding and the lack of resources and infrastructure which such an act of defiance would demand.¹² We cannot, then, deny the power of separate identity in scores of highly differentiated continental communities, many with geographical, cultural or historical barriers as formidable as the seas which seem to set islanders so dearly apart from neighbouring societies, even other islanders.

Still, as Professor de Smith noted, maritime borders may be particularly indomitable: the English Channel, he argues, has been, in some respects, a maritime frontier larger than the Atlantic Ocean itself.¹³ Clearly, for some historians of the British experience, notably Paul Johnson,¹⁴ the very core of British identity is as an onshore island people. Much the same might be said of the Japanese, in so many respects the oriental mirror image of the British. The impact of maritime frontiers as a reinforcement of separateness then cannot be underestimated, given the impressive cumulative evidence of the self-assertion of island societies in the international system. "The uniqueness of an island is its geographic precision," noted David Weale.¹⁵ And this geographic precision is the root and branch of Island identity. Speaking of Prince Edward Island, Professor Weale argues powerfully that

The topography and landscape of this province, that is to say its Islandness, is the source and reference point for the imagination of Islanders. It is the primal source of our communal insight and wisdom.¹⁶

Indeed, these profound sensibilities of separateness and distinct identity have often invited a jurisdictional separateness, not as easily granted or conceded to similarly placed small mainland communities. Island societies, often exceedingly small islands, have been recognised in generous devolution arrangements where similar claims from small mainland communities were dismissed or ignored. The very islandness of the constituency then can lend an advantage to island peoples in debates of political and constitutional devolution.¹⁷

Perhaps this is most dramatically illustrated when we reflect upon the decolonisation of Europe's salt-water empires, particularly in the period after 1960. Though the old colonial powers, especially Great Britain, were resigned to the emancipation of their overseas territories, most did not see, even as late as 1960, the decolonisation of their smallest and poorest possessions, those colourful little specks of pink and purple which accented the maps of fifty years ago.¹⁸ Most of these territories were very small islands. The colonial powers, and even a large lobby within the United Nations, hoped for solutions of political change and self-determination short of sovereignty. The British, particularly, encouraged federation or association with neighbouring states, even non-British states, as a way of allaying fears of fragmentation and concerns over the proliferation of small and isolated states with little hope of a viable existence. Most notably in the West Indies, the British encouraged local leaders in the islands and in then British Guiana to organise themselves into the West Indies Federation.

But this well-intentioned scheme soon foundered on the shoals of Jamaican-Trinidadian rivalry.¹⁹ When it was revived a second time, to include Guyana, Barbados and the tiny Leeward and Windward islands, it collapsed again, largely over the suspicions of the smaller islands that they would be dominated by Guyana and to a lesser extent Barbados. "I do not intend to be one of the sardines lying next to a shark," complained John Compton, the premier of St. Lucia. The shark was Guyana, itself a very small state of approximately 600,000 people.²⁰

At this stage, Caribbean islanders were not necessarily filled with a burning passion for independence. Indeed, some, like Grenada's premier Eric Gairy, were candid in their fears of having to go it alone.²¹ They all readily accepted a half-way-house solution called Associated

Statehood whereby Great Britain would continue to provide for the islands' security and external relations. Otherwise, long-established arrangements of parliamentary self-government would ensure generous levels of autonomy. While island elites at this point were not rushing to independence, they were wary of political integration and state-building across the various straits which separated one from the other in this arc of independent-minded island communities. The distrust of neighbouring islanders, indeed, outright hostility, was dramatically evident in the determination of Anguilla, a truly underdeveloped island of six thousand people, to resist incorporation into St. Christopher-Nevis in 1965. They were not interested in independence but they did insist on separate colonial status. Eventually the hapless British government, which looked faintly ridiculous in this whole affair, recognised the impossibility of forcing union upon Anguilla and much to the anger of then St. Kitts premier, Ronald Bradshaw, Anguilla's separation was reluctantly conceded.²²

Whitehall's efforts to find solutions short of separate independence in every island remnant of empire were echoed by nervous first-generation nationalist elites beyond the Caribbean. In Malta, the prospects of 1964 independence were troubling, even for such an irascible Maltese nationalist as Dom Mintoff particularly if it meant, as it surely would, the closure of the British base, so critical to the island's post-war economy. The Maltese lobbied for a status similar to the Crown Dependency territories of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.²³ And, there was in this loyal island society, awarded as they were the George Cross for their sacrifices to the Empire in the Second World War, a deep and genuine attachment to Great Britain. But, as Harold Macmillan recognised a decade earlier, the British had neither the resources nor the will any longer to sustain such ties, even with the loyal Maltese. Similarly, in the Seychelles, Premier James Mancham fought for years against the anti-colonial rhetoric of the Committee of Twenty-Four in the United Nations and, particularly, against demands for independence in the Organisation of African Unity. He wanted the Seychelles to remain British and abandoned this quest only when he came to the conclusion that the international climate combined with indifference in Whitehall rendered this a hopeless cause.²⁴ In like manner, the Sultan of Brunei, whose state is a bifurcated enclave within an island, resisted independence for years, supporting the security services of the Gurkhas to ensure the continued existence of his country against pressures for integration with Malaysia.²⁵

The first island colony with a very small population to achieve independence was Cyprus.²⁶ Up until this point the only sovereign states in the world of this population size were Iceland and the European continental micro-states: Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra. And, apart from Iceland and Luxembourg, these little states were regarded at the time as Ruritanian exceptions to prove the rule that there are normal dimensions of statehood. But within a few years of Cyprus' independence, the relentless logic of self-determination pressed on: in Barbados, Mauritius, Malta, Nauru, Equatorial Guinea, the Maldives, Western Samoa.

By the 1970s, the process of self-determination had reached every last corner of the old imperial world: from Bahrain to the Seychelles, from Antigua and Barbuda to Fiji and Kiribati.²⁷ Today there are some thirty very small island states in the international system, that is islands with populations of less than one million, which enjoy the full panoply of jurisdictional prerogatives that sovereignty allows. Nor is the process necessarily complete. The premier of Nevis, speaking for a constituency often thousand, has stated that the people of Nevis are now about to set in

motion their constitutional right to secede from the federation of St. Christopher-Nevis, arguing that both their options for economic development and their dignity as a separate people can no longer be met within the arrangements of the federation.²⁸ And so this little state seems poised to face dismemberment yet again! If we survey the world, we can soon recognise similar patterns of fragmentation in many other island regions. It is likely, for example, that some political accommodation in New Caledonia will see an independent Kanak state in at least part of the territory of this difficult settler colony.

Self-determination movements in other small island societies are still open to some question. We can offer few confident assessments, let alone prescriptions about the future of small island jurisdictions in these closing years of the 20th century, when clearly, forces of fragmentation are as determined and resolute as the logic of interdependence and integration. The Dayton Accords alone stand as a dramatic example of the relentless pressure of particularism in spite of all efforts to contain it.²⁹

Islands have certainly figured largely in this century-end dismantling process. Of course, we are now particularly sensitive to the unravelling of the last of the European empires: the Russian imperial system. Perhaps it was less expected because this was an empire which seemed indestructible and its subject peoples were contiguous and physically attached. In the Western world we readily think of imperialism as a blue-water adventure, the conquest of peoples beyond our maritime frontiers. The gradual and persistent displacement and colonisation of indigenous peoples within our own land mass, both in America and in Russian Eurasia, has rarely been seen until very recently in the same context, and thus has been slow to acknowledge. Indeed, the sanctity of the principle of territorial integrity in itself inhibited recognition of self-determination claims among minority peoples within the boundaries of established states. But, in the end, the Russian empire collapsed under the weight of the same pressures that exposed the hollow authority of Spanish governors in Equatorial Guinea and French settlers in Algeria and Indochina and British civil servants, missionaries, school teachers and farmers almost everywhere. All were interlopers in these lands. The history of decolonisation is one of recurring and painful experiences of rejection and removal, perhaps all the more pressing in island societies, from Cyprus to little Nauru, when imperial exhaustion and colonial confidence combined to produce a new agenda of expectations for both anxious mentors and the restless wards themselves.

In some cases, in islands particularly, demands for separate jurisdictional recognition were conceded by default. The independence of such improbable island sovereign states as Sao Tome and Principe, Grenada and Nauru³⁰ was based finally on the exhaustion of alternative schemes. In other cases, the very islandness of the constituency gave those people an advantage in a protracted debate of devolution. In Aruba, Tuvalu³¹ and Anguilla, the realities of separateness doomed so many well-meaning schemes for association.

It is important to reflect a little upon this dimension of fragmentation in the international system. European colonisation left a conflictual legacy in many of these island territories just as it did in the historic scramble for Africa. In both cases, European imperial interests bore little relationship to existing patterns of identity and association among the conquered peoples. In the case of island societies, artificial boundaries of governance were created without any respect to separate island communities and pre-colonial political loyalties. In due course, that is, with the process of

decolonisation itself these older sources of identity would reassert themselves in scores of separatist movements, pitting local leaders against new post-colonial elites with a now vested interest in the integrity of the colonial state. In some cases, as in Mayotte,³² or the pathetic story of Anguilla, local leaders for a time looked to the metropolitan power as an alternative centre to that of the hated regime of the proposed new state.

The power of self-assertion and the demand for some sort of jurisdictional recognition was and continues to be most troubling in island and archipelagic dependencies. In Rodrigues, for example with its overwhelming Creole majority, association with the French island of Reunion seemed more logical than union with the Indo-African dominated Mauritius.³³ Similarly, for nationalists in Bougainville,³⁴ metropolitan determination to include the island within an independent Papua-New Guinea was a betrayal of both their geography and their history. In Tobago, Barbuda, the lower Grenadines, Carriacou and scores of other island dependencies within island states,³⁵ powerful forces of localism still test the will and magnanimity of central governments and even the integrity of the states themselves.

But the road to self-government, let alone the drift to sovereignty in small island societies, has not been a universal phenomenon. Many small islands still find themselves subject to the priorities and dictates of neighbouring mainland communities, in spite of powerful sources of localism and separateness. Cape Breton Islanders, for example, stoutly assert their island identity in a rich cultural outpouring across the arts while they bemoan their political impotence in the absence of island jurisdictional institutions. Perhaps the Cape Breton situation is the norm, reflected in the relatively weak political and jurisdictional capacities of most offshore American and Canadian islands and so many of the islands of the European continental states. Consider the Scottish islands, for example. Most must be satisfied with the limited jurisdictional capacity of a municipality Skye is subject to the comparatively huge over-arching authority of the Highlands and Islands Council. Only the Shetlands, perhaps as Nordic as they are Scottish, the Orkneys and the Western Isles have locally rooted institutions of significant self-government.³⁶

For Cape Breton Islanders, the status of Prince Edward Island as an equal province and full partner in the Canadian federation is enviable indeed, just as the status of the Western Isles appears so favoured to the people of the Inner Hebrides.³⁷ Yet they may take heart from a general trend in the Western world to recognition of the special circumstances of small islands within the framework of existing nation-states.

We should also stress that many islanders do not share a zeal for the kinds of autonomy arrangements suggested thus far. If we consider the various overseas island territories of the United States, for example, we quickly recognise that they have not been swept up in the universal campaign for sovereignty which seized the imagination of so many of their neighbours under European administration. Yes, there is an independence movement in Puerto Rico but it has consistently failed to win majority support over a series of electoral tests in spite of international and especially regional sympathy for the sovereignty cause. Most Puerto Ricans prefer to maintain their status as a Commonwealth of the United States, with all the privileges that that dearly suggests.³⁸ Similarly, Virgin Islanders are not agitating for an end to American "colonial rule." In both cases, these islanders have very different historical and cultural experiences which underscored powerful sense of separate identity, particularly when measured

against those of mainland Americans. Indeed, their accession to the American family is relatively recent. Yet, American acculturation and the enormous economic benefits which accrue from continued association with the United States have done much to inhibit sentiments of political grievance and thus the independence movement.

There is a similar pattern in America's Pacific island territories. American Samoa and Guam³⁹ have remained largely indifferent to the clarion call for decolonisation which swept across the South Pacific in the 1970s. Indeed, the prosperity of American Samoa compared with their kith and kin in the formerly New Zealand-administered Western Samoa and the generally benevolent consequences of American administration in this territory have substantially undermined any appeals for national self-determination based on a united Samoan state. Even in the United States Trusteeship Territories, the desire for independence was tempered by the equally powerful need to preserve links to the United States.⁴⁰ The Carolines and the Marianas have opted to remain as American Commonwealth territories. The Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau have all opted for sovereignty but with post-independence defence and security and foreign policy agreements with the United States that are really tantamount to continuing American trusteeship.

Perhaps the most important island territory of the United States, the only island which is a state of the Union, Hawaii, offers some of the most interesting insights into the questions we are considering in this discussion. In many respects, Hawaii is a classic case of colonisation, a powerful indigenous culture governed by strong and enlightened monarchs who consolidated the islands into a single kingdom while, at the same time, cultivating links to the Western world. These links would eventually undermine both local institutions of self-government and the cultural confidence of the islanders themselves. Missionaries, along with well-meaning liberal constitutionalists, paved the way for the absorption of Hawaii into Western civilisation, in this case eventual annexation to the United States in 1898. This is comparable to the patterns of European penetration across the Pacific, with European governments assuming an administrative role only in the wake of missionary activity, trading outposts and cargo cults which created conditions of peaceful transition to Western governance. Precisely because this transition was one of constitutional evolution, it is difficult to see it in the context of the classic models of European colonialism, surely a comparison which many Americans would find odious. Still, though the penetration was benevolent, generous and even enlightened, the long-term effect was the Westernisation, indeed the Americanisation, of a South Pacific culture. Hawaii became a state of the Union in 1959 but, more important, Hawaii's historical partnership with America dates only formally from 1900 and substantively from the deposition of Queen Liliuokalani as a consequence of American intervention in 1893.

Today there are interesting movements among Hawaiians to reclaim their pre- Western. or pre-American historical self-view.⁴¹ But the islands have been changed forever and would seem now to be part of the eternal landscape of the United States. Such enormous historical shifts of identity and allegiance are recurring in the history of an ever-changing tapestry of political geography. There is no reason to believe that an independent Hawaiian kingdom and culture could have survived larger historical forces of change and penetration than other self-defining societies-the Burgundians, the Bavarians, and above all, the Venetians are to draw upon European analogies where those societies had more resources of resistance than Pacific islanders

did in their naive dose encounters with the West. Hawaii, as much by historical accident of engagement, followed a different path than Tonga, though the initial patterns of penetration were similar. And, today, it is inconceivable that Hawaii's aspirations for self-government would be met many other circumstances than those of separate statehood within the most powerful and prosperous state in the world.

America's distant islands, then, have all demonstrated a reluctance to leave the comfortable embrace of being American in a world where that is a very privileged status. Even the three island communities which chose sovereignty did so with all those insurance policies in place. Only France has been able to replicate this continuing authority and loyalty in its island territories. Even in Tahiti where the French nuclear programme has tested the loyalties of committed island centralists, there is still little sentiment for independence and separation from France. France invests huge subsidies in its overseas island territories, in Reunion, Guadeloupe and Martinique, and in, of course, the South Pacific territories, and even in St. Pierre and Miquelon. Compared to their neighbours in each of these regions, these French citizens are living the good life indeed. It is no wonder, as in the American territories, that arguments for independence fall on deaf ears for the most part.

Finally, let us consider those American islands which are truly offshore, the archipelagic islands of New England, for example. Clearly, these islands do not aspire to federal status. That would be ridiculous in this context, as it would be in Canada. Prince Edward Island is a special case, perhaps an historical accident. No other island community in Canada, with the possible exception of Cape Breton, could seriously present an argument for separate jurisdiction comparable to the kind of regional devolution, particularly among island regions, that we see in Europe. Still, in many Canadian and certainly American islands, there is a powerful sense of distinctive identity, of separate interests, of contending issues with mainland communities and mainland authorities. There is clearly a common sense of preserving both the environmental and cultural integrity of each island community.⁴² And, above all, there is determination to preserve the institutions central to the preservation of the island community: the school, the local store, the fire department and the delivery of bottom-line health services and support systems to elderly island residents.⁴³ And every island recognises the unique character of his island, however wanting the judsditional capacities may be.

Some island communities in the United States enjoy vigorous powers of local government; witness the chutzpah of the mayor and local council of Hilton Head.⁴⁴ Others have a wide but deeply rooted community base of mutually self-reinforcing groups which together assert the particular interests and the common conceros of those islands. They may be groups dedicate to the environment, of beaches, dunes and other special island attractions; organisations concerned with wildlife management, particularly since most small islands are hosts to discrete patterns of wildlife settlement and migration; or groups committed to the cultural and historical properties of that island's history and life cycle. This kind of rooted popular participation in the definition and protection of the island's special character seems to be evident in almost every island community across the New England Shore. They do not necessarily need the kinds of jurisdictional levers demanded by more culturally and nationally differentiated islands in both the decolonisation process and in the general revival of European regionalism. Still, in Nantucket, in Bar Harbor, in Martha's Vineyard, there is a sense of island identity which seeks to project their community

separately and distinctly across a broad range of issues with huge community involvement in a variety of island-based decision-making bodies.

This is the picture, then, for many small island communities both in North America and in Europe too, where there are still many small islands which fall well short of the devolution arrangements outlined in our discussion thus far. The sense of island identity and the commitment to promoting island specific interests and values may be no weaker here than in those societies which enjoy generous measures of self-government, but the means and instruments are different.

Moreover, even in those small islands where a powerful yearning for self-government has long existed, the successful realisation of autonomy depends on the willingness of the metropole to devolve jurisdiction to the island community. By the 1960s, and certainly over most of their far flung islands. They were anxious to withdraw completely by whatever arrangements of self-determination were possible: federation, integration with a neighbouring state, or separate independence. But, in those cases where a metropole is determined to maintain the “intergrity” of their sovereign territory, the cause for self-government may be doomed. With the awarding of the Nobel Peace prize to Jose Ramos Horta, we are sadly reminded of the formidable obstacles to self-determination in some small islands, however powerful the claims for autonomy maybe. Certainly, East Timor, a small lusophone, Roman Catholic island community with five hundred years of distinctive history, satisfied every United Nations principal and precedent for separate independence. Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor not to mention the genocidal occupation which followed, was wholly without foundation, in international law or in United Nations decolonisation practice.⁴⁵ While the East Timor case is raised every year in the General Assembly, the inertia of the major powers and particularly Indonesia’s principal Southeast Asian partners, has largely sealed the fate of this small island society. Perhaps the Noble Prize will arouse the conscience and indignation of the international community,⁴⁶ but that is probably a faint hope. In short, while patterns of devolution and autonomy have characterised the political development of scores of small communities, it is by no means an irresistible wave. When pitted against recalcitrant metropolitan governments, it can be successfully turned back.

In contrast, there are certain islands where metropolitan centres have long recognised their institutions of self-governments and where arrangements of autonomy are continuing to evolve. The Crown-Dependencies, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, have never been part of the United Kingdom. Indeed, they are quite detached constitutionally form almost every European and international association. Ironically, the famous promenade in the Manx capital of Douglas is marked by a prominent and central display of three flags: the Union Jack of Great Britain, the twelve gold stars of the European Union and the familiar blue flag of the United Nations. But, the Isle of Man belongs to none of these associations! The Crown Dependency territories are just that, possessions of the Crown, sharing the sovereignty of Her Majesty as Lord of Man and Duke of Normandy but not as territories of the United Kingdom nor subject to the laws of Westminster. In practice, the historical experience has been quite different, as the Queen and her predecessors have consigned responsibility for these dependent territories to her ministers, particularly the Home Secretary. At the end of the Second World War, the Home Office was a regularly intervening player in the public affairs of these territories and certainly their principal interlocutor with the outside world. But British constitutional practice, elastic as it is, is always a

matter of convention. And piece by piece, precedent by precedent, sometimes seemingly oblivious to Whitehall, the parliaments of the Crown Dependencies claimed and recovered one area of jurisdictional competence after another. Eventually, the larger mandate of London to ensure good government in the islands was rendered more difficult to implement given the concessions recognised in practice and now established in convention. Today these small islands enjoy a range of jurisdictional competence that surely would have seemed impertinent fifty years ago, while the interventions of the British governor, once expected as a matter of course, are both rare and somewhat embarrassing.⁴⁷

In short, further devolution has occurred in these small islands almost by stealth, certainly by painstaking incrementalism. All of these islands enjoy considerable latitude of policy-making which has allowed them to pursue innovative strategies of economic diversification, particularly in the services and high-tech manufacturing sectors. They still lack some of the international representation capacities enjoyed by other sub-national jurisdictions; Quebec, for example,⁴⁸ or indeed Newfoundland, or Catalonia or the Nordic Home Rule island territories. But their scale of self-government has been stretched dramatically over the last fifty years. These are cases of historical detachment and autonomy, long recognised in law but always honoured in practice, being changed within the evolving circumstances of their regional and global milieu.

Self-government in the Nordic Home Rule territories has a very different history. Though the Faeroes, like the Icelanders, challenge the Manx claim to the oldest parliament in the world, they were more directly governed from the metropole until modern times. Icelanders clawed back self-government in 1878, won autonomy in all by foreign affairs and defence in 1918, and full sovereignty in 1944.⁴⁹ The Faeroes achieved Home Rule in 1948 and the Greenlanders in 1979. The Aland Island Home Rule experience is not so much the consequence of devolution as it is the product of international resolution. Finland agreed to accept international terms for the distinct constitutional status of Alands in terms of its own parliamentary institutions, the protection of Swedish language and culture and its permanent non-military status. In a sense, the Aland continue to be an international ward in that the preservation and the potential expansion of their autonomy is within the context of a now famous and landmark international treaty.

In all these Nordic cases, real devolution has taken place within the context of existing practices and with amendments to the original Home Rule constitutions. The Aland Islands have gained major concessions both in terms of real power and symbolic recognition and special derogations over a series of amendments to the Home rule constitutions.⁵⁰ Each new set of negotiations is confidence building and Aland Islanders continue to look for concessions in terms of taxing powers. It is one thing to have latitude in the expenditure of block grants from Helsinki, which, given the transfer payments from the islands to the central government, are justified anyway. It is another to have the power to raise revenues within the archipelago from a wide range of sources. This remains a bone of contention just as it puts the Alands, at least in this crucial area of jurisdictional competence, at one end of the autonomy spectrum with Isle of Man at the other. At the same time, however, Aland Islanders were free to determine a relationship to the European Union which could have been very different from their fellow Finnish citizens and they maintain their own office of liaison in Brussels.⁵¹ Moreover, they maintain an independent seat in the Nordic Council. The Isle of Man's relations with Brussels, in contrast, are largely administered through the Home Office even though the Manx government is fully in control of its own

revenue. Wherein does autonomy lie?

In the Faeroes and Greenland there are not the restriction on taxing powers. And both islands societies enjoy a detachment from the metropole that would be considered enviable in other dependent but independent-minded island communities. Greenland, after-all, was the only territory ever to secede from the European Union! This unthinkable, and, for some, unspeakable act, was possible only given the generous devolution of self-government with the Danish Realm. Greenland is both a huge island, the largest in the world, and a small archipelago of 55,000 souls scattered across a range of communities linked by air or sea; certainly not by land. Its public government is a mixture of expatriate Danes and upwardly mobile Inuit who are claiming Greenland as Kalaallit Nunaat. Self-government is an on-going process. Gradually, competencies are being shifted from Copenhagen to Nuuk. Perhaps, in the end, this will lead to the first effective Aboriginal sovereign government in the Americas.⁵²

The story of the Faroese is a very unhappy one. While the Faroese enjoy large powers of self-government, they are, in the end, compromised by the tragic economic decline of the islands, especially since the bank crisis of 1992. A critical ten per cent of the population, among them many of the best and the brightest, have left their homeland, typically to Faroese neighbourhoods in Copenhagen. And the dependence of the Faroese on Danish transfers and debt relief seriously compromises formal Home Rule status just as it undermines the confidence and leverage of Faroese governments. Some nationalists may see this as crisis which holds its own opportunity to end the cycle of dependence once and for all. Perhaps this is the very time to address the issues of paternalism and dependency which run through the bank crisis issue. But just as many other Faroese may be intimidated by the consequences of Danish withdrawal when the stakes are so high in a time of crisis.⁵³

Movements to recognise the special circumstances of island societies have been particularly successful in northern Europe. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the restoration of civil society in so many of its parts, genuine local government has been restored in such islands as Saaremaa in Estonia. Even Gotland, a Swedish county in its own right, was able to present its own case for special status within the European Union in a rather impertinent White Paper. That initiative was finally blocked by Stockholm, determined to treat all Swedish counties alike, island or not, does not in itself defeat the islandness and the separateness which so inspired Gotland commune governments in their dealings with both the metropole and the outside world. In so many ways, they have forged and carved out areas of jurisdictional and cultural distinctiveness which, though falling well short of their Scandinavian compatriots in the Alands or Faeroes, still give them a separate presence, a visibility and acknowledgement if not formal recognition, in those European bodies such as the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions which was so helpful in the preparation of their White Paper initiative. "What does Gotland want?," the White paper asked. And, even the most cursory reading of this very attractive document would suggest a distinct island society in the Baltic, perhaps the last redoubt of the Hanseatic League.⁵⁴

When we move to the south of Europe we find a very mixed set of arrangements in the contest between defensive nation states and increasingly assertive regions, in our case island regions. The revolution in Portugal in 1974 and the conversion to a democratic constitution in Spain in

1975 opened unprecedented opportunities for offshore islands in these hitherto highly centralised states. In Portugal, the post-Salazar government dominated by the left-wing MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas) readily conceded the defeat of the Portuguese imperial mandate in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and, sadly and shamefully, by withdrawal in East Timor. But, in the course of this imperial disrobing and constitutional renewal, very real concessions were also given to the Portuguese offshore islands, the Azores and Madeira. These were already distinct societies within the Portuguese mainland experience. Indeed, each island within the Azorean archipelago stoutly defends its own culture in a variety of artistic expressions. Together they are root and branch of Portuguese diaspora in North America, in Toronto and Boston particularly. They fiercely defend their island conservative values against mainland cosmopolitanism and integration. Devolution of regional government to the Azores and to Madeira, itself as much Africa or South Africa as it is Portuguese, flowed from the generous liberal dispositions of those early post Salazar governments. Today the Portuguese islands enjoy a wide measure of self-government, albeit within the centralising biases of the nation government in Lisbon.⁵⁵ Similarly, in the Canary Islands, large measures of autonomy have been granted largely to contain separatist movements that might be courted and supported from mainland African mentors.⁵⁶

Even in Corsica, there have been some measure of devolution⁵⁷, though such concessions fall well short of the measure of self-government enjoyed in Quebec or debated in Scotland. Indeed, they fall well short of nationalist demands as the continuing violence in this unhappy little island so tragically demonstrates.⁵⁸ President Mitterand's disposition to acknowledge the ancient pre-revolution France of the regions, however modest, was limited finally by the Constitutional Court's discussion to reject any recognition of Corsicans as a national people. Real powers of devolution to the Corsican assembly then have been obscured by nationalist Corsican defiance in the face of an insistence that there is only one France and one French People. Functional concessions of self-government, however generous, may be ignored in the larger clamour for acknowledgements of identity and dignity, particularly in such an island as Corsica, so recently incorporated in France, and still harbouring a powerful sense of separate historical self-view and for many, separate destiny still.

The trend to regionalism and regional self-assertion is by now a cottage industry in itself in the literature of the social sciences.⁵⁹ And for many it is a mantra for the shape of the new Europe. Indeed, provincialists and centralists seem to be seized by the same code words, notably subsidiary, to promote their own visions of Europe; an increasingly integrated federation of once warring states or a Gaullist partnership of proud and distinctive nations. Leaders of Europe's sub-national regions, including increasingly bold island jurisdictions, see all of this as welcome debate and unexpected opportunity to advance the claims of sub-national regions in the new Europe.⁶⁰ These trends in Europe are being echoed, as we have suggested earlier in this discussion, in many sub-national island communities across the world.

Of course, the assertiveness of small societies in pressing their claims for autonomy is also a reflection of the counter-trend to interdependence and integration both at the regional and global levels. Indeed, the seemingly contradictory patterns of centripetal and centrifugal forces at play in the international system are, in many respects, symbiotic and mutually reinforcing. As indicated earlier, both metropolitan governments and island political elites experienced a huge

shift of expectations during the decolonisation process itself. Doubts and fears about separate independence gave way to new confidence in the pursuit of self-government. In large part this was due to a growing network of regional and global supports systems which could sustain even the most fragile new states. As Stanley Hoffman noted, the United Nations systems itself, with all its various agencies and regional commissions, “. . .[wraps] the right privileges of the Charter around the frail and the shivering.”⁶¹ This is even more powerfully the case with the ever deepening bonds of economic integration at the regional level. Both Scottish and Quebecois nationalists, for example, argue that separation would not mean isolation in a cold, lonely and unforgiving world, given the existence of the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement which are seen to serve as safety nets for small nations embarking on a separate course. Patterns of international and global integration then actually serve as incentives for the assertion of local campaigns for autonomy just as the globalisation of market forces are seen by many not as intimidating impediments to self-determination but rather as opportunities for niche exploitation.

Still, the development of autonomist movements in so many of the world's islands does not necessarily mean a mass proliferation of small island sovereign states, though clearly in some cases, as in New Caledonia, that is the likely outcome. In many islands, claims for great self-government have been met within constitutional arrangements of association. In the Cook Islands while the government in Avurua tends to all domestic matters. Indeed, this arrangement is so flexible that even in some areas of external relations—the Cook Islands' membership in the South Pacific Forum and the South Pacific Commission for example—there is considerable latitude. Moreover, the Cook Islanders are free to end this relationship and choose sovereignty at any time in the future.⁶² Similarly, Bermudans last year rejected the call for independence promoted by their then premier, Sir John Swann,⁶³ in exchange for the continued security of a colonial relationship with Great Britain, albeit one which gives Bermudan government and parliament generous powers of self-government.⁶⁴ In Aruba, which was once committed to separate independence in 1996 for the other islands of the Dutch Antilles and, indeed, from the Netherlands itself, the local parliament successfully negotiated an indefinite postponement of that promise to remain in a loose three-way association with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles.⁶⁵

The movement to greater autonomy in so many of the world's small islands does not mean, then, the inevitable, and perhaps endless proliferation of island sovereign states. It will be a long time before the good people of Pitcairn hoist their flag in the United Nations plaza! But it does mean that as islanders gain confidence, as they see the potential resourcefulness of jurisdiction itself, movements for greater autonomy within existing constitutional arrangements are likely to continue.

There are two factors to bear in mind in assessing these patterns. First there is the mobilisation of political resources on the part of islanders themselves. Within the European Union, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions have been a potent force for the island regions of Europe to articulate their interests both with their home governments and with Brussels.⁶⁶ Often, this forum allows for the combined pursuit of common interests bolstered by the information resources of the CPMR, particularly the vast Eurisles project,⁶⁷ a compilation of a massive database on European islands. The existence of such a valuable institutional infrastructure have

encouraged a new interest in the well-being of Europe's island regions. Similarly beyond Europe, the establishment with the United Nations of the Alliance of Small Island States, have brought scores of small island jurisdictions, both sovereign and non-sovereign, together to compare common problems and to pursue common objectives.⁶⁸ Clearly, to benefit from such collaboration is itself an argument for a measure of jurisdictional status with at least some capacity for self-representation.

There is, indeed, a growth industry in the comparative scholarship of islands. The University of Malta, long a pioneer in this field with its many conferences and publications on island issues, recently elevated its programme in small islands and small states to a full Institute within the University.⁶⁹ The Institute of Island Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island launched a ground-breaking initiative with an international conference in 1992 examining the relationship between constitutional status and economic development experiences among some twenty-five islands of the North Atlantic Rim. This particular cluster of islands, unlike those in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the South Pacific or even the Indian Ocean, have remained largely neglected in the comparative literature of small island studies. The Institute have subsequently initiated—in partnership with NordREFO, The Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research—an ambitious programme of research and public exchange across seven North Atlantic small island jurisdiction: Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, the Isle of Man, the Faeroe Islands and the Aland Islands.⁷⁰ What makes this particular group of islands so interesting is that they represent a wide range of autonomy arrangements: provincehood within a federation in Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, Crown Dependency Home Rule in the Isle of Man, Nordic Home Rule models in Greenland, the Faroes and the Alands and, of course, full sovereignty in Iceland. The central thrust of this three-year research programme is to explore the importance of jurisdiction as a resource, the relevance of constitutional status to various strategies for economic development. What powers count and in what context? How relevant, for example, is the Isle of Man's autonomy in accounting for Manx success in the services and in manufacturing since the early 1970s? Is jurisdiction capacity a factor in explaining the huge disparities between two very similar North Atlantic rocks, Iceland and Newfoundland, the former an inspiring success story and the latter the poor child of the Canadian federation? The programme has targeted four sectors where these questions are explored by international teams of researchers: primary food production, small-scale manufacturing, tourism, and the export of knowledge-based services. The Programme also seeks to promote inter-island networking and co-operative projects in such areas as joint ventures in software and North Atlantic tourism. This very ambitious initiative have won the support of all the island governments concerned, either through NordREFO directly or through the Institute of Island Studies, a commitment which is, in itself, yet another example of growing island self-consciousness in an increasingly competitive world.

A second factor which should be addressed in assessing the development of autonomy movements in so many small islands is the demonstration effect of economic success in those small island with a generous measure of self-government. Much of this success belies the traditional orthodox view that such small islands were likely to remain wards of the international system, so chronically wanting and dependent that pretensions to self-government were both ludicrous and hollow.⁷¹ In truth, the evidence thus far hardly supports those intuitive predictions any more that it justifies the fears and apprehensions of those islands who were reluctant to

loosen the bonds of dependence.

For instance, of the twenty-four small island states for which data is available, sixteen enjoyed average annual G.D.P. growth rates of over three per cent between 1985 and 1993, enviable by European and North American standards.⁷² Moreover, many of these islands—Malta, Mauritius, the Eastern Caribbean states and even the Maldives—had annual average growth rates in this period of between five and nine per cent. Not a single island state recorded negative growth in this sample. Similar patterns are evident in the growth of export trade. More important, however, is the degree of diversification, largely unexpected at the time of independence. Most of these small island states have experienced a diversification both in the commodity composition of their export trade and in the geographic direction of that trade. Not only has there been a growth in manufacturing in many of these small islands, but a major expansion of services as well. Finally, there has been a diversification of capital sources both from the private sector and from official donors. Bilateral assistance still accounts for the largest share of ODA, but all the recipient states now enjoy diversified aid portfolios which are comparable to that of more established and much larger states within their respective income groups.⁷³

Jurisdiction is a factor here. Most of these small islands were once almost wholly dependent in their trade relations on the metropolitan centre. Certainly they were dependent on that centre exclusively for sources of capital investment. Now they are able to present themselves to foreign governments, international corporations and multilateral organisations directly and on their own terms. Their status is a green card, if you like, for entry into the world's boardrooms and there to exploit the phenomenon of globalisation in the pursuit of niche strategies. For many, the risks of going it alone have been compensated by admission to the field. And this holds true for such non-sovereign islands as the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Bermuda, the Caymans and the Cook Islands where a generous level of autonomy has allowed for sufficient self-representation that these governments can pursue similar strategies to those of their sovereign counterparts.

What is so heartening in these developments is that the bleak prognoses of the nay-sayers has been rebutted by the relative success of so many small island jurisdictions, both sovereign and non-sovereign. In their success, these islanders have powerfully asserted their proud separate maritime identities, fulfilled their expectations of dignity, and most important in so many cases, have broken the yoke of dependency. And by that we mean wholly concentrated dependency, wherein all major economic engagements are through a prevailing economic power, be it in the transfer of goods and services, the investment of capital, the market for commodities, and such services as tourism. In such a concentrated relationship, all economic activities occur within the all-consuming nonetheless. It is a relationship which is both powerless and humiliating for a self-conscious proud island community.

To an extent, of course, these small island economies, even if they have achieved some measure of diversification, will still confront for some time an agenda of dependence management. It is a question of reducing overwhelming dependence by means of linking to external sources of relief and development. Most cannot expect an unfettered or uncompromised and boundless autonomy. But this in itself is a ridiculous paradigm, even for much larger jurisdictions in an increasingly integrated world. And what sense is there in holding small island jurisdictions hostage to unrealistic and wholly intuitive models? Better for islanders to concentrate on an adroit exploitation of niche opportunities, imaginative uses of jurisdiction levers, and incremental

diversification at all levels of economic activity. Such an agenda of dependence management can be both confidence-building and materially rewarding at the same time.

We began with the recognition of heightened sensibilities of identity and dignity which characterise island living. And, in tracing the rise of autonomist movements at all levels among small islands, we are witnessing the assertion of those sensibilities through jurisdictional claims and competencies that might be translated into unexplored areas of economic development. If those objectives can be realised, then both islanders and mainlanders have cause to rejoice.

Endnotes

NOTES

1 Milton Acorn, *Dig Up My Heart: Selected Poems 1952-83*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983, p. 52.

2 An interesting approach to the problems of defining the concept of insularity may be found in Jean-Didier Hache, "The Island Question: Problems and Prospects," *Elastics LIV*, Number 323/324, March/April, May/June, 1987, 88-92.

3 Stanley A. de Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories*. New York: New York University Press and London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1979, pp. 55-92. See also, Malcolm Anderson, "The Island Dimension," in Allan Macartney (ed.). *Islands of Europe*. Edinburgh: Research Centre for Social Sciences, University of Edinburgh, pp. 1-5.

4 Paul Theroux, *The Happy Isles of Oceania; Paddling the Pacific*. New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1992. In all of his island visitations from the Solomons and Fiji, to Tonga and Samoa, Paul Theroux has an acute sense of separate island dimensions of culture and identity within larger island communities.

5 John Ostheimer, for example, takes exception to de Smith's argument that insularity is an inherent and definitive characteristic of islanders. Ostheimer's own research among the islands of the Indian Ocean, he argues, would not support this as universally valid. John M. Ostheimer, "Are Islanders Different? A Survey of Theoretical Ideas," in John M. Ostheimer (ed.). *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 13-27.

6 In speaking to the outward-looking culture of his countrymen, Sigurdur Magnusson stressed "the enterprising frontier mentality of the Icelanders, the spirit of adventure and exploration urging more than half the entire population to travel abroad every year despite the physical obstacles and the exorbitant expenses involved." Sigurdur A. Magnusson, *The Icelanders*. Reykjavik: Forslot Publishing Co., 1990, p. 12.a

7 Would-be Icelanders, for example, must take on Icelandic family names, though stage personalities, such as Vladimir Ashkenazy, are exempted. Ashkenazy has singularly thrust the rich and gifted Icelandic classical music community into the international mainstream with his

patronage and his international presence.

8 North Korea's insularity is tragic in the extreme; its people are starving, and the society is literally dying on the vine, in service to the lunatic regime of the Kim's which has crazily embraced insularity as a source of legitimacy.

9 By the 1980s, Westminster was increasingly sensitive to the Welsh language movement. Now Welsh is a compulsory language in all the Principality's schools just as Welsh history and literature are standard offerings in the curriculum. About thirteen per cent of primary school children are taught exclusively in Welsh and there is enormous support for Welsh immersion courses, particularly now that Welsh has equal status in all public institutions and services. *The Economist*, May 16, 1992, 78.

10 C. Northcote Parkinson, "The Role of the Provinces in Europe of the Future," *Regional Contact*, 1993, 8-15.

Yvo J. D. Peeters, "Regionalisation de l'Europe et "Europeisation" des Regions," *Regional Contact*, 1989/1

Michael Keating, "Regionalism, Peripheral Nationalism and the State in Western Europe," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* XVII, Winter 1991, 117-125.

11 The commitments of successive Luxembourg governments, and certainly poll after poll in the Grand Duchy, are clear evidence that this little state is the most supportive of the integration process in the European Union. For Luxembourg, its separate identity and distinctive international personality thrives within the context of an integrating European milieu. Jean-Marc Hoscheit, "Administrative Adaptation in the Context of European Integration: Luxembourg and the European Community," in Randall Baker (ed.). *Public Administration in Small and Island States*. West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1992, pp. 267-268.

12 Giuseppe Rossi, *A Short History of the Republic of San Marino*. Modena: Foligrafico Artioli, undated, p. 86.

13 de Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

14 Paul Johnson, *The Offshore Islanders*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.

15 David Weale, "Islandness," *Island Journal* VIII, 1991, 82.

16 *Ibid.*

17 The seemingly irresistible case for separate self-government of so many small islands was noted in a much-cited UNITAR study of very small territories. Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba, and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*. New York: Amo Press, 1971, p. 49.

18 The protracted debate over what to do with Great Britain's smallest territories, particularly those island dependencies where maritime separateness seemed to defy integrationist solutions,

is particularly well treated in W. David McIntyre, "The Admission of Small States to the Commonwealth," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* XXIV, No. 2, May, 1996, 244-277.

19 One of the most thoughtful accounts of the failure of the West Indies Federation remains that of Amitai Etzioni in what is still a standard work on political integration. Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 138-183.

20 Independence for Grenada-Myth or Reality? (Proceedings of a Conference on the Implications of Independence for Grenada sponsored by the Institute of International Relations and the Department of Government, the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, 11th- 3th January, 1974) St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1974.

21 In a letter to the Premiers of the Associated States, Coard Papers, June 25, 1969, quoted in Richard Jacobs, "The Movement Towards Grenadian Independence," in *Independence for Grenada-Myth or Reality?*, op. cit. p. 30.

22 de Smith, op. cit, pp. 64-70.

23 Brian Blouet, *The Story of Malta*. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1989, pp. 215-218.

24 John M. Ostheimer, "Independence Politics in the Seychelles," in John M. Ostheimer, *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 161-192.

25 D. E. Brown, "Brunei on the Morrow of Independence," *Asian Survey* XXIV, February, 1984, 201-208.

26 Cyprus was all the more powerful a case because the implications of its independence as a precedent were readily perceived at the time. McIntyre, op, cit, 261-270.

27 Though Western Samoa became independent in 1962 and Nauru in 1968, the Pacific was really the last area of the globe to be decolonised with the remaining states achieving sovereignty after 1970. Indeed, there are still territories, such as New Caledonia, which remain as dependencies of European states.

H. E. Maude, "South Pacific: Independence and Regionalism in South Sea Islands," *The Roundtable* Number 243, July, 1971, 369-381.

28 *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), August 30, 1996, A13.

29 As many commentators have observed, the Accords seem to endorse the fragmentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than ensuring the durability of an integrated Bosnian state.

30 Nancy Viviani, *Nauru: Phosphate and Progress*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1971.

31 The Tuvaluans or Ellice Islanders were determined in their resistance to continued association with Gilbert Islanders in a single state.

"Tuvalu: Small but Independent," *The Roundtable*, No. 272, October, 1978, 381-82. Barrie MacDonald, "Secession in the Defence of Identity: The Making of Tuvalu," *Pacific Viewpoints* XVI, Number 1, May, 1975, 26-44.

32 John M. Ostheimer, "The Politics of Comorian Independence," in Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-101.

33 de Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Phillip M. Alien, "Mauritius: The Ile France Returns," in Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-101.

34 During the preparations for independence for Papua-New Guinea, the islanders of Bougainville argued for a separate course of self-determination given their distinct ethnicity in the new state. If association was to be countenanced, the stronger case was with their fellow Melanesians in the Solomon Islands, an archipelago of which Bougainville is the largest island. Though Papua-New Guinea should be sympathetic to this cause, given the sad plight of their fellow Papuans in West Irian, the jealous protection of state frontiers, however artificial, tends to dull such sensibilities. And the war for self-determination in Bougainville rages on.

The Economist, October 19, 1996, 41.

35 See for instance, Ralph R. Premdas and Hugh Williams, "Tobago: The Quest for Self-Determination in the Caribbean," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* XIX, Nos. 1-2, 1992, 117-126.

36 Allan Macartney, "The Scottish Islands Debate," in Macartney, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-23.

37 Kenzie MacNeil, "Maritime Union: A View from Another Island," *Maritime Union: Is it a Good Idea for P.E.I.?* Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1996, pp. 41-42.

38 Indeed, some are concerned that indifference to independence may pose unwanted problems of status determination for the United States, that is the question of statehood for Puerto Rico. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Is Statehood for Puerto Rico in the National Interest?," *In Depth* III, Number 2, Spring, 1993, 89.

39 While independence remains an unlikely and unattractive option, the Chamorro people of Guam are still acutely conscious of their own cultural distinctiveness and look to arrangements for autonomy within the larger embrace of the United States. The draft Commonwealth Act of 1987, for instance, offers just that kind of compromise. Note the recent comments of the Governor of Guam: Carl T. C. Gutierrez, "An American Colony," *The Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition October 14-20, 1996, 27.

40 The complicated history of America's relationship with its Pacific Trust Territories is well-documented by former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Donald McHenry: Donald F. McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed: Altruism vs Self Interest in American Foreign Policy*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975.

41 Ellen Nakashima, "Hawaii for the Hawaiians?," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, September 9-15, 1996, 30.
Joye Mercer, "A Fighter for Hawaiian Sovereignty," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 16, 1994, A6.

42 The case of Long Island off the coast of Maine is a powerful testament to the political extrapolation of island identity. The three hundred souls of Long Island did not feel themselves to be a neighbourhood of the city of Portland, as its mainland wards would feel instinctively. They felt oddly out of play in the municipal agenda, an offshore island whose interests and concerns fell well beyond the perennial concerns of Portland's City Council. After two years of jurisdictional contest, the people of Long Island finally won devolution of self-government to their own newly-instituted local council. It is, according to Sharon Marr, a pioneering figure in this devolution battle, an arrangement which is best for both the islanders and the people of Portland. Long Island now enjoys the jurisdictional levers to shape the architecture of their community, from school systems to social services, from environmental controls to investment strategies. There is a clear sense among the people of Long Island that the future of their island is now in their own hands.

Sharon Marr, "The Experience of Long Island," in a panel, "Do We Have a Choice?" Annual Conference of the Island Institute (Rockland, Maine), Castine, Maine, October 19, 1996.
The Town of Long Island Research Committee Report. Long Island, Maine: Long Island Civic Association, September, 1992.

Town of Long Island Annual Report, 1995-96. Long Island, Maine: Town of Long Island, 1996.
A full account of Long Island's path to self-government can be found in *A History of Long Island*. Long Island, Maine: Town of Long Island, 1994.

43 These challenges were addressed dramatically in a panel of representatives from a diverse spectrum of New England island communities at the annual conference of the Island Institute, convened in Castine, Maine, October 19, 1996. All of the panellists spoke to the urgency of ensuring these fundamental services within their very small island communities. In one case, a challenging extreme case to be sure. Great Cranberry Island in Maine, it was up to an overstretched and deeply committed leadership group within a community of forty-five souls to ensure that these public services would be delivered.

Barbara Stainton, "The Experience of Great Cranberry Island," in the panel discussion, "Is There a Choice?," Annual Conference of the Island Institute, Castine, Maine, October, 19, 1996.
Transcripts available from the Island Institute, Rockland, Maine.

44 Frank Chapman, the Mayor of Hilton Head, has mounted a powerful campaign against conventional prescriptions for economic development, particularly in the tourism sector. He has fought what he considers to be a "Neanderthal state legislature" in his attempts to restrict tourist access and limit development on his small 42-square-mile island. Of the legislature he echoes a

familiar complaint among so many island communities in their attitudes towards higher jurisdictional authorities: "They don't want people to have anything to do with creating their own future."

The Vineyard Gazette (Martha's Vineyard), April 1, 1994, 6.

45 Nancy Viviani, "Australia and the Timor Issue," Australian Outlook XXX (No. 2, August, 1979), 198.

Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem," Australian Outlook XXIX (No. 1, April, 1975), 19

Robert Lawless, "The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor," Asian Survey XIV (no. 10, October, 1976), 962.

46 In Canada, at least, the Nobel Prize happily has had just that effect. The East Timor network, with branches in eleven cities, has chalked up a number of consciousness-raising successes over the last few years which have at least moved Canada to support a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Commission calling for an investigation into conditions on the island. For the most part, however, Western governments have been indifferent to the cause of East Timor self-determination.

The Globe and Mail (Toronto), October 23, 1996, A13.

47 Simon A. Horner, "The Isle of Man," In Albert P Blaustein and Phyllis M. Blaustein (eds.), Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1987, pp. 1-114.

T. St. John N. Bates, "Home Rule in the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands," a paper presented to the international conference, "An Island Living," Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, September 17-20, 1992.

in Barry Bartmann and T. N. St. John Bates (eds.), The Road to Self-Government: Patterns of Autonomy in Small Islands. Charlottetown, Institute of Islands Studies, forthcoming, 1997.

David Kermode, "The Isle of Man," in Macartney, op. cit., pp. 41-71.

T. St. John N. Bates, "The Legislative Process in the Isle of Man," The Loophole, February, 1996, pp. 5-10.

Robert Quayle, "The Isle of Man Constitution," in Vuaghan Robinson and Danny McCarroll, The Isle of Man: Celebrating a Sense of Place. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1990, pp. 123-132.

Ernest Shanks, "The Channel Islands," In Macartney, op. cit., pp. 73-81.

48 Panayotis Soldatos, "Cascading Sub-nation Paradiplomacy in Interdependent and Transnational World," in Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Frey (eds), States and Provinces in the International Economy. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California; and Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queens University, 1993, pp. 45-64.

49 Jón R. Hjálmarsson, History of Iceland: From the Settlement to the Present Day. Reykjavík: Iceland Review, 1993, pp. 102-168.

50 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, 16 August 1991, 1144. English translation published in February 1993. Mariehamn: The Aland legislative Assembly, The Government of Aland, 1993.

Roxanne E. Henry, "Dependency of the Aland Islands," in Blaustein and Blaustein, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-9.

Elisabeth Naucmér. "The Aland Islands: Their National Position under Constitutional Law," in Bartmann and Bates, *op. cit.*

51 Niklas Fagerlund, "Aland's Path to a Special Status within the European Union," a paper delivered at the Aland Government Building, 4 October, 1994. Mr. Fagerlund in the Aland Councillor at Finland's Permanent Mission to the European Union in Brussels.

52 Finn Beinholt Larsen, "The Quiet Life of a Revolution: Greenlandic Home Rule 1979-1992," *Inuit Studies XVI*, Number 1-2, 199-226.

Tønnes O. K. Berthelsen, "Greenland Home Rule," *Indigenous Affairs*, No. 1, January-February-March, 1995, 14-20.

Lisa Lyck, "The Danish Home Rule Model for the Faroe Island and Greenland," in L. Lyck and V. I. Boycko (eds.), *Management, Technology and Human Resources in the Arctic (the North)*. Dordrecht: Kluwers Academic Publishers, 1996, pp. 117-139.

53 Jón Pauli Joensen, "The Home Rule Model: Opportunities and Limitations. An Essay on the Case of the Faroe Islands," in Bartmann and Bates, *op. cit.*

Herman Schmid, "The Future of the Faroe Islands: Adaptation, Innovation or Major Change?," in Sámal Tróndur Finnsson Johansen (ed.), *Nordiske fiskersamfund I fremtiden*, vol. 2: Sma samfund under eurpoeisk intergration. København: TkemaNord 1995: 586, Nordisk Ministerrad, 1995, pp. 71-87.

54 White Paper: Gotland in the Baltic Sea, in Sweden and in Europe.... Visby: Gotlands Kommun, 1994, note especially pages 4-5.

55 Carlos Pacheco Amaral, "The Roots of Azorean Autonomy and Identity," in Bartmann and Bates, *op. cit.*

Mota Amaral, "The Azores," in Macartney, *op. cit.* pp. 149-159.

56 Maria Asunción Asin Cabrera, "the Canary Islands," in *ibid.*, pp. 137-147

57 After being incorporated in France in 1768, Corsica's aspirations to autonomy were suppressed within the typical centralising institutions of the French state. Either the island was divided into two Départments or it was integrated with Provence and the Côte d'Azur. Only with President Mitterand's generous initiative in 1981 was this situation substantially changed. A Special Statute for Corsica allowed for the election of a Corsican Assembly and a gradual devolution of powers. This model of "Mediterranean Home Rule" is certainly modest in comparison with Nordic islands, but it does represent a significant change from the past. Michael Biggi, "Fourteen Years of Special Lessons: The Statues of Corsica: 1982-1996," in Bartmann and Bates, *op. cit.*

John Loughlin, "Corsican-French Relations," in Macartney, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-90.

Lucien Felli, "Corsica: Mediterranean Home Rule," *ibid.*, pp. 92-105

58 Corsican militants have taken their campaign into metropolitan France with the recent

bombing of the office of the mayor of Bordeaux, Prime Minister Alain Juppé. The terrorists, estimated to number from fifty to one thousand, do not represent mainstream opinion on the island. At the same time, it is clear that there is widespread support for a greater measure of autonomy, including a recognition of the Corsicans as a national people and promotion of the Corsican language. Nationalist parties won over twenty per cent of the vote in the last elections to the island's assembly.

The Economist, October 12, 1996, 53.

59 Annual conferences on "Europe of (the) Regions" are sponsored by the Institut d'Estudis Autnòmics in Barcelona together with the Foundation for International Understanding in Copenhagen which also publishes the excellent journal, Regional Contact.

60 In 1994 the European Union Launched a Committee of the Regions to bring sub-national regions in the policy-making process, though some have regarded this as a largely symbolic gesture thus far.

Thomas Christiansen, "Second Thoughts on Europe's 'Third Level': The European Union's Committee of the Regions," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* XXVI, Spring, 1996.

61 Stanley Hoffman, "Regulating the New International System," in Martin Kilson (ed.), *New States in the Modern World*. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1975. P. 179.

62 David Stone, "Self-government in the Cook Islands, 1965," *Journal of Pacific History*, Number 2, 1965, 168-178.

63 Sir John Swann, "Progress Through Partnership: Managing Dependent Territories: Bermuda," a paper delivered to the Dependent Territories Conference, Queen Elizabeth Conference Center, London, 24 November, 1993.

64 C. Walton Brown, Jr., "Bermuda and the Politics of Independence: Race, Reaction and Electoral Politics," in Bartmann and Bates, op. cit.

C. Walton Brown, Jr., "Bermuda and the 1995 Referendum," *Lessons for the Edge* III, Number 1, March, 1996, 7.

65 In this case dissent was as much focused on neighbouring islands in a not altogether successful association. Aruba's resentments at perceived Curaçao domination and the apparent drain on Aruba's prosperity from the smaller islands within the Dutch dependency led to Aruba's separate status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1986 with the promise that full independence would be granted in 1996. Over the subsequent years, nationalist politics were played against growing concerns in the Netherlands for the security of Aruba, particularly given evidence of drug-trafficking from the island and long-standing Venezuelan irredentism claims which had not been put to rest. By 1994 all three government, Aruba, the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, agreed to a Commonwealth formula which would grant considerable autonomy to Aruba but still place the island and her neighbours with a reassuring Dutch security embrace. Plans for eventual independence were not foreclosed. But complete independence now will have to command a two-third vote in the Aruba Staten as well as a majority in a referendum.

Clearly, independence have been moved to a back burner while concessions to autonomy have won the confidence of current Aruban leaders across a broad political spectrum. In the meantime, the latitude granted by the new autonomy arrangements has allowed Aruba to make separate overtures to her neighbours, most importantly Venezuela, which has long claimed Aruba and the other Dutch islands within her extensive irredenta.

“Aruba,” in *Europa World Yearbook*, Volume II. London: Europa Publications, 1994, pp. 2157-2167.

66 Jean Didier Hache, “Island Representation in the E.E.C.,” in Macartney, op. cit., pp. 161-181.

67 Eurisles Information System. Rennes: Eurisles Administration, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, 1996.

<http://www.Teaswer.fr/eurisles/homepage.htm>

68 The work of the AOSIS in mobilising small islands to promote their interests in the international system have been most dramatic in the successful launching of internet capabilities even among the smallest and most remote member states. See, for example Peter Meincke, Final Report on the Update of SIDS Net Feasibility Study for the Alliance of Small Island States, 1996.

See also

Communiqué of the Alliance of Small Island States, at the Second Summit of the Alliance of Small Island States. Bridgetown, Barbados. 4 May, 1994.

69 The Institute of Small Islands and Small States, the Foundation of International Studies, the University of Malta, Valletta, Malta.

70 *Lessons for the Edge: the North Atlantic Islands Programme*. Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 1994.

71 Even more cursory review of the literature on small islands and micro-states, that is in the year between 1960 and the mid-1980s, would consistently reflect a metropole-centred view of the world. If one scans the literature, now rather large, there are few exceptions to this perspective. Perhaps the most powerful counter voice at the time was Roger Fisher, “the Participation of Microstates in International Affairs,” *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1968, 153-163, 164-188.

And more recently, a fundamental challenge to intuitive conventional orthodoxies can be found in the writings of Geoffrey Bertram. Note especially,

Geoffrey Bertram, “Sustainability, Aid and Material Welfare in Small South Pacific Island Economies, 1900-1990,” *World Development XXI*, Number 2, 1993, 247-258.

Geoffrey Bertram, “Sustainable Development in Pacific Micro-Economies,” *World Development XIV*, Number 7, 1986, 809-822.

72 *The Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Economic Review and Basic Statistics*. London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996, pp. 40-41.

73 Comparative data has been assembled by the author for all the world's micro-states, both islands and continental diminutive territories in a manuscript which has been submitted for publication, *Lilliput Rising: Micro-states in the International System*.

For a more cautious and perhaps sceptical view of the prospects of small island economies see Lino Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities," *World Development* XXIII, Number 9, 1995 1615-1632.

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